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Abstract 
This paper mainly focuses on the various ways through which a social cash transfer 
program can be designed and financed. We identify four types of households which 
are considered to be vulnerable to be targeted with cash transfers. This includes 
households with orphans, old individuals, young and labor constrained. Extending a 
cash transfer to these households would lead to less poverty over the simulation 
period. These programs which would be constrained to less than 0.5 percent of 
GDP would have a small impact on the overall economy. By increasing taxes to 
finance the program this would wipe out the potential benefits of the cash transfer 
program of reducing poverty.  1 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Though ranked among the best performing economies in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Uganda’s social development indicators including infant, child and maternal mortality 
remain among the worst in the world (Human Development Report, 2007). Further, 
Uganda’s Chronic Poverty report (2005) estimates that 26% of the total population of 
Uganda (over 7 million people) lives in chronic poverty, with a sizable proportion 
being Orphans and Other Vulnerable Children (OVC). The failure to transform robust 
macroeconomic performance into social economic transformation has contributed to 
increased income poverty and social exclusion.  It is therefore critical that we identify 
sections of the population that are considered to be vulnerable and design programs 
that can partly address poverty among the vulnerable. 
 
 Social protection instruments such as social cash transfers are recognized as an 
effective response to a range of social and economic problems which arise from 
livelihood shocks and stresses. Social cash transfer programs aim to provide basic 
social protection to those sections of the population who, for reasons beyond their 
control, are not able to provide for themselves. People in need of basic social 
protection usually live in labor-constrained households, that is, households with no 
adult members fit for productive work. Due to their limited self help capacity, these 
households cannot access any of the labor-based poverty reduction programs 
offered by governments or aid organizations. The bulk of households in need of 
basic social protection are headed by the elderly, widows, children, or individuals 
who are disabled or chronically sick.  
 
In particular, unconditional cash transfers are rapidly gaining support as a response 
to chronic poverty, food insecurity and AIDS in high HIV-prevalence countries of east 
and southern Africa, where most governments lack the resources to implement 
comprehensive social security systems, and the coping capacities of families and 
communities are severely over-stretched.  In addition, in Uganda, just like many 2 
 
other low income African countries, three factors are placing an undue burden on the 
elderly. First, the burden on the elderly has enormously increased with the increase 
in mortality of prime age adults due to HIV AIDS pandemic and regional conflicts. 
Second, the traditional safety net of the extended family has become ineffective and 
unreliable for the elderly. Third, the elderly have increasingly been called upon to 
shoulder the responsibility of the family as they became the principal breadwinners 
and caregivers for young children. Consequently, combining growth strategies with 
social protection represents one of the surest ways to achieve economic and social 
development. Such efforts are particularly important especially given that the 7 
million chronically poor Ugandans could have a “recoil” effect on the rest of the 
population impeding economic growth and adversely affecting development 
outcomes. 
 
Cash transfers are still widely regarded as an under-exploited tool for providing cost-
effective basic social protection to critically poor sections of the population with most 
governments and development partners favoring food aid. It is against this back 
ground that this study seeks to examine the feasibility of social cash transfers as a 
means of providing social protection amongst the chronically poor so as to eradicate 
poverty.  
 
The paper focuses identifies four major groups of households considered to be 
vulnerable. First we identify households which have orphans (where both father and 
mother are dead). The second type of vulnerable household is the one with the 
elderly. The third type of vulnerable household is the one with young population and 
poor.  Lastly are the households that are labor constrained or with a dependency 
ratio of more than 3. We target these households with a cash transfer that is 
equivalent to 30 percent of the median expenditure of the household group. In all 
cases, the poverty of the households would be reduced. Given the transfer program 
is restricted to 0.5 percent of GDP, the macroeconomic effects of these social 
transfer programs are considered to be marginal. The program is financed by 
running a higher deficit. Raising taxes to finance these programs would indeed wipe 3 
 
out the potential benefits of a social cash transfer program through the distortions of 
income or consumption by also the vulnerable households. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II provides some related 
literature on cash transfers. Section III provides a summary of the objectives of the 
study. Section IV provides a summary of the results from the UNHS which describes 
the vulnerable groups. Section V is a summary of the model used. Section VI 
provides the main results. Lastly is the conclusion. 
 
II. Related Research 
 
Many developing countries, especially the LDCs in sub-Saharan Africa, including 
Uganda, have to date not made much progress with regard to achieving the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This is often cited as one of the reasons 
why a number of international initiatives urge governments and development 
organizations operating in these countries to prioritize basic social protection. Some 
of these initiatives argue from a human rights perspective and/or from the 
perspective of specific vulnerable groups like the elderly or orphans. Others focus on 
the link between social protection and pro-poor growth. However, all these different 
schools of thought conclude that social cash transfers have a positive impact on 
development and are an underexploited tool for achieving rapid and cost-effective 
reductions of hunger and critical poverty. The transfers also complement other forms 
of assistance by providing basic social protection to households that cannot be 
reached by mainstream development and poverty reduction programs.  This section 
reviews some of these studies and initiatives both in Sub-Saharan African and other 
parts of the world.   
 
Schubert (2008), examines the sequence of policy decisions that have to be taken in 
the process of developing an integrated national social protection programme in 
which social cash transfers are one instrument among others for Malawi and 
Zambia. Decisions examined include the priority setting, mix of interventions, and 4 
 
nature of interventions (project based or institutionalized) and the choice of 
implementing agencies. Regarding the priority setting, four groups of households are 
identified: moderately poor, labor constrained, ultra poor who can perform productive 
work, and the ultra poor who lack the ability to respond to development projects or 
programs because of their inability to engage in productive work
1.   
 
Schubert (2008) argues that social protection interventions should give priority to the 
ultra poor households. This is especially the case since the core objectives of social 
protection is include reduction and eventual eradication of ultra poverty and 
preventing the moderately poor households from sliding into ultra poverty.  
 
Regarding the mix of interventions, Schubert (2008) argues that different types of 
households require various types of interventions. He argues for instance that the 
third category of households requires temporary transfers so as to meet their 
immediate basic needs such as food while the fourth household category requires 
regular and reliable social transfers which will empower them to meet their basic 
needs and to invest in human capital—health and education of their children. 
 
On the question of whether interventions should be project based or institutional, 
Schubert (2008) points out that social assistance should be seen as permanent 
service such as education or health rather than as a project with an effective 
strategy. As such, social assistance should be seen as a core Government function 
to be implemented by Government officers. However, NGOs can implement 
emergency related temporary transfer programs in cash or kind, or get involved in 
programs targeting the third household category. It is important to note that social 
cash transfer schemes for fourth household category should be implemented by 
                                                 
1 Households in the first category though poor are considered to be in a “favorable” position since they are able to respond to 
self-help oriented projects and programs in order to overcome their poverty and hunger. Households in the second category 
are labor-constrained and are therefore unable to respond to labor-based interventions. Such households are usually headed 
by a pensioner, who receives a small pension, or households that are regularly supported by the extended family.  
The third category households suffer from ultra poverty in spite of the fact that they have household members able to perform 
productive work. This category includes small-scale farmers and fishermen. Improving the economic situation of such 
households requires programs specifically tailored for vulnerable but viable households. The last category of households 
suffers from ultra poverty. At the same time they cannot respond to development projects or programs because they have no 
household members able to perform productive work. In addition, such households have little or no self-help capacity. 
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Government.  He argues that the most promising approach may be to select a 
Government agency which is politically well established and has potential that can 
be strengthened by systematic and long term capacity building. 
 
Evidence from the Zambia and Malawi cash transfer schemes—which are designed 
to accommodate the above four policy decisions—reveal a significant positive 
impact with regard to food security, health, shelter and education of the members of 
the beneficiary households. Evaluations also show that the assets of beneficiary 
households have increased dramatically. This has improved their productive 
capacity and reduced their vulnerability to shocks. Non-recipient households have 
benefited because the burden of caring for destitute households has reduced and 
the high economic multiplier effect of cash transfers has strengthened the local 
economy. 
 
The largest cash transfer programme for children in East and Southern Africa (ESA) 
is South Africa’s national child support grant, targeting more than 9 million children. 
Several other countries have smaller programmes, either demonstrations (Kenya, 
Malawi, Zambia), or established programmes with low coverage (Mozambique). 
Lesotho is currently designing a SCT that targets orphans and vulnerable children, 
while both Botswana and Namibia have either in-kind or cash assistance 
programmes for families that care for orphans. Several other countries are currently 
considering SCTs on a trial basis, including Angola, Rwanda, Tanzania, and 
Uganda. Such programmes, therefore, are very much part of the social policy 
dialogue in ESA. 
 
As momentum gathers around SCTs in ESA, there are many technical questions 
about programme design parameters such as targeting, transfer levels and overall 
affordability (Handa & Stewart, 2008). Regarding orphans, an important policy 
question is how to expand such programmes so that they reach the children most in 
need of assistance. Some of the critical questions include: should governments 
explicitly target households with orphans for receipt of cash assistance? Or should 6 
 
the programmes focus more broadly on poverty as the key underlying determinant of 
vulnerability? 
 
Handa & Stewart (2008) use micro-simulations to get answers to these questions. In 
particular, macro-simulations are used to determine who would be reached under 
different targeting schemes in terms of demographics and poverty, using household 
surveys from selected countries. The schemes analyzed are stylized versions of 
those currently operating in ESA: (i) labor-constrained households (Malawi, Zambia); 
(ii) households with elderly or disabled members (Mozambique); (iii) households with 
orphans (Botswana); and (iv) households with children (Kenya). A fixed budget of 
0.5 per cent of GDP, with 20 per cent administrative costs, is used. A flat transfer of 
30 per cent of median consumption of the bottom quintile in each country is 
provided.  
 
Handa & Stewart’s (2008) findings reveal that for Uganda and Malawi, more children 
of any kind are reached by either the child- or orphan-centered scheme, particularly 
children in the poorest consumption decile. In both countries the orphan scheme 
reaches all orphans in the bottom decile, but fewer children in that decile. In Malawi, 
the orphan scheme reaches only about 25 per cent of children in the poorest decile, 
as it does in Uganda, pointing to the potential trade-off in targeting poor families with 
children versus those with orphans only. The study also reveals that trade-off 
becomes less clear when all children in the bottom three deciles are considered. 
Handa & Stewart (2008) conclude that if policymakers give greater weight to children 
in the ultra-poorest category and if good targeting is possible, then the scheme that 
favors children over orphans will reach more children in the poorest decile relative to 
an orphan-targeted scheme. Such a scheme would also reach about 50 per cent of 
orphans in the bottom decile. 
 
In addition, Handa & Stewart (2008) show that for all four countries, the proportional 
gain in per capita consumption among recipient households is higher for strategies 
that target children explicitly, as compared to strategies that target labour-7 
 
constrained, age-and disability-vulnerable or orphan households. This underscores 
the fact that the child focused scheme connects with poorer households, suggesting 
that orphans are not necessarily clustered in the bottom consumption decile. Similar 
results are obtained when the squared poverty gap (SPG) is analysed—this is the 
poverty indicator that is most sensitive to changes in welfare among the very 
poorest. In all four countries the greatest improvements in SPG are brought about by 
strategies that target households with children, while strategies that target labour-
constrained households have the least effect.  
 
Handa & Stewart’s (2008) simulate the impact of SCTs on school enrolment, using a 
probit model to estimate the relationship between expenditure and schooling. A 
comparison of the estimated impact across targeting strategies in all countries under 
study indicates that reaching households with children has a greater impact on 
school enrolment than other strategies. Other schemes yield lower increases in 
school attendance because they reach fewer children, and those they do reach are 
relatively affluent. 
 
In summary, SCTs in ESA that target households with orphans reach the highest 
number of orphans, but they include households in the third consumption decile 
while excluding many of the poorest children living in the bottom two deciles. 
Targeting poor families with children, however, leads to a greater concentration of 
resources among the very poorest households and the highest coverage of children 
in the bottom decile. This underscores the key dilemma faced by policymakers 
particularly in a context where social protection is driven by the HIV and AIDS-
mitigation agenda.  There is a tradeoff between pure poverty targeting, or targeting 
poor households with children, and targeting households with orphans. This trade-off 
is especially important when the focus is on the ultra-poorest households—those in 
the bottom consumption decile. 
 
Social pensions though designed to address old age poverty, have implications on 
education and health outcomes even among children. Many of the resources 8 
 
support human capital development for children and help them grow into more 
productive adults. Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius and Namibia are among the SSA 
countries that pay universal pensions. South Africa offers a means-tested pension 
scheme.  Research shows that social pensions in these countries reduce hunger 
and extreme poverty while improving health care, education and gender equality.  
 
A key concern associated with SCTs is feasibility: are SCTs affordable, and if so, 
how much would it cost?  It is important to note that the cost of implementing a SCT 
will depend upon diverse factors particularly the scope and coverage of the scheme. 
Several studies have analyzed the possible costs of a basic social security package 
for low-income countries, including those in Africa
2. For instance, an ILO study (ILO, 
2008b), conducted as a part of the social protection expenditure and performance 
review in Zambia, analyzed the cost of hypothetical cash benefits (but the child 
benefit limited to the first child). This study revealed that in the longer run it would 
cost no more than 1.5 per cent of GDP, excluding administrative costs. A similar 
exercise for Tanzania (ILO, forthcoming) put the costs for the same package at a 
little more than 1.8 per cent of GDP. 
 
A related concern is the share of government spending devoted to social protection 
in low income countries. The total government spending (including social security 
funds) of lower-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa is 25–30 per cent of GDP. 
However, most of these countries allocate a very small percentage of the available 
domestic and external resources to financing the provision of social protection. Many 
countries allocate less than 1 per cent of GDP for cash transfers and in-kind social 
assistance. All but a few governments allocate less than 2 per cent of GDP
3.  in 
addition to the meager allocations to social security, the benefits reach only a small 
part of the population—in most cases, only government employees and those in the 
private sector who have regular contractual employment. Virtually none of the 
                                                 
2 See for instance ILO (2008a) and ILO (2008b).  
3 Six countries in SSA allocate more than 2 per cent of GDP to non-health social protection: Morocco (3.0%), Egypt (4.5%), 
South Africa (5.0%), Mauritius (5.3%), Tunisia (7.4%), and Seychelles (9.3%). Uganda allocates 0.4 per cent of her budget to 
the provision of non-health social security.  9 
 
benefits go to the majorities, particularly those working in subsistence agriculture 
and the urban poor. 
 
Sufficient financing necessary to build up basic social security systems and 
gradually reach all of those in need would require shifts in the current allocations of 
budgetary resources. Hagemejer (2008) argues that this will necessitate more than 
one intervention: first, rationalizing existing social programmes, by making them less 
costly and/or more effective in meeting poverty reduction goals. This will require 
integrating or coordinating current social assistance or social insurance programmes 
to avoid overlap and waste; cutting administrative costs in existing contributory 
pension programmes; and improving design and overall governance. Second, 
reassessing all current government spending programmes to determine whether 
they serve the broader policy objectives of reduced poverty and inequality to 
minimize “cash” transfers to the rich (for example, fuel subsidies). 
 
III.  Objectives of Study 
 
III.1   General Objective 
 
This study seeks to examine feasibility and poverty consequences of social cash 
transfer schemes amongst the chronically poor households in Uganda.  Efforts will 
be made to study the poverty consequences of these schemes on children and the 
elderly (relative to other groups) in Uganda. 
 
III.2    Specific Objectives 
 
In particular, this study seeks to: 
 
i.  Assess the feasibility of social cash transfers in Uganda especially the 
cost of the transfers; 10 
 
ii.  Quantify the poverty effects of cash transfers amongst the chronically 
poor households. 
 
IV  Who Are the Vulnerable in Uganda to be targeted 
Four strategies are used to identify households that are considered to be vulnerable. 
Using the 2005 Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS) we identify the 
following groups:  
1.  Labor constrained households, which have no able-bodied members 
between the ages of 15 and 60, inclusive, or have a dependency ratio 
greater than three. 
2.  Households with age-vulnerable or disabled adults. Age-vulnerable 
households have a female member above the age of 55 or a male 
member above the age of 60.
4  
3.  Households with children. “Vulnerable children” are defined as the poorest 
children, hence this scheme effectively targets poor households with 
children less than 18 years of age. 
4.  Households with orphans are where both parents mother and father are 
dead and are also very poor. 
5. Poorest  households 
 
The first four schemes represent versions of existing cash transfer programs that 
have been done in other countries within the region. Scheme 1 is being used in 
Malawi and as a pilot in Zambia. Scheme 2 is used in Mozambique. Scheme 3 has 
been used in Kenya. Scheme 4 has been implemented in Botswana. Using the 2005 
UNHS data, Table 1 provides a summary of the extent of vulnerability in Uganda. As 
shown in the table, its clearly revealed that the extent of vulnerability in Uganda 
cannot be underestimated. For instance, about 34 percent of the households in 
Uganda have a dependency ratio of more than 3. This implies that the number of 
households with a significant proportion who are old and young and few able bodied 
workers is significant. Among the poor population, 22 percent have a dependency 
                                                 
4 From the UNHS survey its difficult to identify the chronically ill. 11 
 
ratio of greater than 3. Households without any old person are about 70 percent of 
the total. However, households with at least 1 old person are about 30 percent. 
Among the poor, about 30 percent of them have an old person. Households without 
any young person are 13 percent. Not surprising, poverty is more prevalent in 
households with a high number of children.  
   
 
Lastly, a significant proportion of households have orphans. This is partly due to the 
AIDS/HIV pandemic and wars in the Northern region. The incidence of poverty 
increases with the number of orphans in a household. 
 
Non-Poor Poor Total
A.  Labor Constrained
Dependency ratio<3 61.7 77.9 65.6
Dependency ratio>3 38.3 22.1 34.4
B.  Households with old individuals
0 old people 70.2 69.3 70.0
1 old person 18.3 20.9 18.9
2 old people 7.5 7.7 7.5
3 old people 2.3 1.3 2.1
4 old people and above 1.7 0.8 1.5
C.  Households with young individuals (less than 18 years)
0 child 15.2 4.0 12.6
1 child 12.2 7.0 10.9
2 children 15.4 13.2 14.9
3 children 16.3 17.0 16.4
4 children 13.3 18.6 14.5
5 children and above 27.6 40.4 30.7
D.  Households with orphans
0 orphan 59.6 51.2 57.6
1 orphan 5.3 4.2 5.0
2 orphans 5.6 6.4 5.8
3 orphans 7.5 8.1 7.6
4 orphans 6.4 9.2 7.0
5 orphans and above 15.7 21.0 16.9
Table 1: Vulnerable Population in Uganda12 
 
Also of interest is to know the regional distribution of the vulnerable populations. The 
index in the chart is as follows (hh=household, po=poor, np=nonpoor, olda=old 
individuals, labc=labor constrained, orph=orphans, ynga=young and non-vulne=non 
vulnerable). From the four charts below, its very clear that the North has more 
households than any other region which are poor with young children or orphans.  
 
 
V.  The Uganda Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) 2007 
We use a SAM which was published by UBOS in 2002, and later updated in 2007. A Social 
Accounting Matrix (SAM) is a table which summarizes the economic activities of all agents in 
the economy. These agents typically include households, enterprises, government, and the 
rest of the world (ROW). The relationships included in the SAM include purchase of inputs 
(goods and services, imports, labour, land, capital etc.); production of commodities; payment 
of wages, interest rent and taxes; and savings and investment. Like other conventional 
SAMs, the Uganda SAM is based on a block of production activities, involving factors of 
production, households, government, stocks and the rest of the world.  13 
 
 
For the purpose of the simulations used, the main adjustment to the SAM made in this paper 
is to replace the households with the vulnerable groups identified above. We derive the 
consumption weights and labour incomes from the UNHS by the new classification of 
households and apply these weights to the aggregate household spending and income in 
the 2007 macro SAM. The Uganda SAM identifies three labour categories disaggregated by 
skilled, unskilled and self employed. Land and capital are distributed accordingly to the 
various household groups. 
 
VI.  Salient Features of the CGE Model 
The CGE model used in the present study is based on a standard CGE model developed by 
Lofgren, Harris, and Robinson (2002). This is a real model without the financial or banking 
system (See Table A1). It cannot be used to forecast inflation. The CGE model is calibrated 
to the 2007 SAM. GAMS software is used to calibrate the model and perform the 
simulations. 
 
Productions and commodities 
For all activities, producers maximize profits given their technology and the prices of inputs 
and output. The production technology is a two-step nested structure. At the bottom level, 
primary inputs are combined to produce value-added using a CES (constant elasticity of 
substitution) function. At the top level, aggregated value added is then combined with 
intermediate input within a fixed coefficient (Leontief) function to give the output. The profit 
maximization gives the demand for intermediate goods, labour and capital demand. The 
detailed disaggregation of production activities captures the changing structure of growth 
due to the pandemic. 
 
The allocation of domestic output between exports and domestic sales is determined using 
the assumption that domestic producers maximize profits subject to imperfect 
transformability between these two alternatives. The production possibility frontier of the 
economy is defined by a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function between 
domestic supply and export. 
 
On the demand side, a composite commodity is made up of domestic demand and final 
imports and it is consumed by households, enterprises, and government. The Armington 14 
 
assumption is used here to distinguish between domestically produced goods and imports. 
For each good, the model assumes imperfect substitutability (CES function) between 
imports and the corresponding composite domestic goods. The parameter for CET and CES 
elasticity used to calibrate the functions used in the CGE model are exogenously 
determined.  
 
Factor of production 
There are 6 primary inputs: 3 labour types, capital, cattle and land. Wages and returns to 
capital are assumed to adjust so as to clear all the factor markets. Unskilled and self-
employed labor are mobile across sectors while capital is assumed to be sector-specific. 
 
Institutions 
There are three institutions in the model:, households, enterprises and government. 
Households receive their income from primary factor payments. They also receive transfers 
from government and the rest of the world. Households pay income taxes and these are 
proportional to their incomes. Savings and total consumption are assumed to be a fixed 
proportion of household’s disposable income (income after income taxes). Consumption 
demand is determined by a Linear Expenditure System (LES) function. Firms receive their 
income from remuneration of capital; transfers from government and the rest of the world; 
and net capital transfers from households. Firms pay corporate tax to government and these 
are proportional to their incomes. 
 
Government revenue is composed of direct taxes collected from households and firms, 
indirect taxes on domestic activities, domestic value added tax, tariff revenue on imports, 
factor income to the government, and transfers from the rest of the world. The government 
also saves and consumes. 
 
Macro closure 
Equilibrium in a CGE model is captured by a set of macro closures in a model. Aside from 
the supply-demand balances in product and factor markets, three macroeconomic balances 
are specified in the model: (i) fiscal balance, (ii) the external trade balance, and (iii) savings-
investment balance. For fiscal balance, government savings is assumed to adjust to equate 
the different between government revenue and spending. For external balance, foreign 
savings are fixed with exchange rate adjustment to clear foreign exchange markets. For 15 
 
savings-investment balance, the model assumes that savings are investment driven and 
adjust through flexible saving rate for firms. Alternative closures, described later, are used in 
a subset of the model simulations. 
 
Recursive Dynamics 
To appropriately capture the dynamic aspects of aid on the economy, this model is extended 
by building some recursive dynamics by adopting the methodology used in previous studies 
on Botswana and South Africa (Thurlow, 2003). The dynamics is captured by assuming that 
investments in the current period are used to build on the new capital stock for the next 
period. The new capital is allocated across sectors according to the profitability of the 
various sectors. The labour supply path under different policy scenarios is exogenously 
provided from a demographic model. In addition, total factor productivity is also exogenously 
provided according to the assumed impact of AIDS. The model is initially solved to replicate 
the SAM of 2007. 
  
VI  Simulations Results  
 
In this section we briefly discuss the effects of providing social cash transfers to 
households in Uganda. From the background, we identified four major groups that 
we consider to be vulnerable. The social accounting matrix was also adjusted to 
accommodate these types of households. In particular, we identify eight types of 
households. First are the households which are labor constrained. In this regards we 
consider households whose dependency ratio is more than three. Second we 
consider households which have a lot of children and differentiate them into two 
categories poor and non-poor. The third type of households is for orphans where 
both father and mother are dead. These are also differentiated between poor and 
non-poor. The fourth category is where we have men or women aged more than 55 
and 60 years respectively and whether the household is poor or non-poor. We also 
have a broad category of households that are not considered to be vulnerable along 
any of these categories. 
 16 
 
We run five simulations which are described as follows. First, we target cash to 
households which are poor and have several orphans. The incremental cash 
increase is the difference between the poverty line and total spending of the given 
household. The rationale behind this increment is that it would put the household 
above the poverty line and the household would no longer be considered vulnerable. 
This simulation is named ORPHAN. The second simulation is where cash transfer is 
provided to households with old individuals (OLD). We target the transfer to only 
households that are considered to be poor. The third simulation is where we target 
households with a young population and also considered to be poor. The groups are 
combined and the simulation is named (VULN). The fourth simulation is where 
households that are poor and labor constrained are targeted (LABCONS).  
 
For each transfer program, we set a value at approximately 30 percent of the 
median consumption among the households targeted. The choice of 30 percent is 
guided by the figures that have been used in other transfer programs (see 
UNESCO-ESARO, 2008) which are usually 20-40 percent of average consumption 
per person.  
 
For all the simulations above, we assume that there is no adjustment in the tax 
system to finance the cash transfer mechanism. This would imply that the 
government would have to run a higher deficit financed either by borrowing 
domestically or from foreign sources.  However, to fully understand the implications 
of such a program, it’s necessary to run simulations where the program is fully 
funded by raising taxes and there is no increase in the borrowing requirement by 
government. In that regard, we consider two scenarios. First is where the cash 
transfer is financed by increasing direct taxes. In this case the income taxes which 
are largely paid by formal employees are increased to cater for the increased 
expenditure outlays as a result of the cash transfer program. We extend the 
financing option to the three targeting mechanisms mentioned in the first three 
simulations. The second alternative is by using indirect taxes that are much broader 17 
 
to finance the cash transfer program.
5 Under these financing schemes, the model 
takes into account the second-round effects of the cash transfer. In essence, the 
higher tax regime would have an impact on both consumers and firms, and thereby 
reduce the overall net benefit of the program.  
 
The focus in reporting the results is mainly on the poverty implications of the 
households and the macroeconomic implications of the different financing options of 
the cash transfer program. We are also interested to know the extent to which such 
a program is progressive given the types of households that benefits.  
 
Baseline 
The baseline (business as usual scenario) assumes that there is no cash transfer 
program. Hence for all the years, we assume that the government would maintain 
the same level of spending in line with the real growth rate. We also assume that this 
growth path in spending is financed by increasing foreign financing at the same rate. 
The rationale behind this is to maintain the same level of the deficit without 
introducing any distortionary taxes. We set a budget constraint where the total 
spending on the transfer program does not exceed 0.5 percent of GDP. This figure 
has been found to be politically acceptable in other countries which are 
implementing similar programs. For all the simulations this assumption will apply. 
We apply the growth rates derived from the demographic model to the labor 
categories available in the SAM to derive detailed labor profiles according to labor 
type. We assume that the semi-skilled and unskilled would exhibit similar labor 
growth rates under the different scenarios.  
 
  
                                                 
5 The third option which is not considered in this paper would have been the reallocation of spending without necessarily 





Targeting Vulnerable Households (Orphans) 
We first run a simulation where the cash transfer program is targeted to households 
with orphans and old people. Targeting poor households with orphans highlights the 
social protection agenda driven by the vulnerability to HIV and AIDS. As shown in 
Table 1, the number of households that do not have any orphan are 58 percent. 
Households with at least an orphan are about 42 percent. The bulk of these children 
are staying with their extended relatives. However, to properly target such a transfer, 
it’s important to differentiate between the poor and non-poor. Notwithstanding the 
imperfections in targeting the program, we find that under this scenario poverty 
within seven years could be reduced by 1 percentage points. The reduction in 
poverty is particularly more pronounced for the households targeted (with orphans). 
The other aspect of this simulation is that the improvement in the poverty of the 
households with orphans is not necessarily attained at the expense of households in 
other groups.  Compared to the baseline, the other groups remain at the same level 
like in the baseline. Intuitively, this result may suggest that since the program is not 
funded by taxing the population, there are no direct distortionary effects on either the 
rich or poor. The indirect effects are only realized at the macroeconomic level. As a 
result of increased spending by the government, the deficit increases and due to the 
higher borrowing requirement, this would crowd out private investments, hence 
leading to a lower growth rate in investments compared to the baseline.  
 
 
The aggregate GDP level under this scenario does not change much as the 
reduction in investment levels are compensated by the increasing private 
BASE ORPHAN OLD VULN LABC TAX-FINANCING
2008 31.14 31.14 31.14 31.14 31.14 31.14
2009 30.17 29.17 29.67 27.17 29.67 30.17
2010 28.93 27.93 28.43 25.93 28.43 29.07
2011 27.55 26.55 27.05 24.55 27.05 27.61
2012 25.31 24.31 24.81 22.31 24.81 25.49
2013 23.99 22.99 23.49 20.99 23.49 24.29
2014 22.54 21.54 22.04 19.54 22.04 23.15
2015 21.66 20.66 21.16 18.66 21.16 22.08
Poverty P0
Table 2: Poverty Indices Under Various Scenarios19 
 
consumption levels by the targeted households. If these cash transfers were being 
saved and invested in subsequent periods, we would probably have noticed a 
change in growth rate. However, being that the cash is targeted to poor groups who 
can barely meet their consumption needs, it would be utilized largely on 
consumption without much savings. Hence, from a policy perspective, unless these 
transfers are made conditional on investing for example in human capital 
development or physical capital, such programs would not add much to the growth 
rate of the country. The only difference would be the reallocation of resources from 
lower investments due to the higher government borrowing requirement to higher 
consumption levels by poor households. 
 
Since the cash transfer program is targeted to the poorest groups of households, we 
also do not find any significant changes in the production activities across sectors. 
Ideally one would expect that increasing the social cash transfers would have two 
indirect effects at a sectoral level. First, it could stimulate demand and therefore lead 
to sectors producing more as a result of the higher demand. In addition, with free 
cash available to these households, they could change their behaviors and perhaps 
demand for more leisure time relative to the time devoted to work. However, given 
that the magnitude of the increase is small, we do not observe any significant 
changes in production though these two channels.  
 
Targeting Households with Old Individuals 
As shown in Table 1, households with at least old members greater than 55 years of 
age are significant in number (about 30 percent). However, it’s important to note that 
in Uganda most old people tend to be looked after by the extended family system. 
Therefore to identify a proper targeting mechanism for this group it’s important to 
first screen households based on whether they are poor or non-poor. In essence, if 
the old household member is staying in a household that is not poor, would not 
qualify for the cash transfer.  
 20 
 
Similar to the previous simulations, this would also have an impact on the overall 
effect on poverty during the seven years of the simulation. Poverty would decline by 
0.5 percentage point compared to the baseline. It’s important to note that the effect 
for this experiment is more marginal compared to other simulations like for targeting 
households with many youth. This is partly because the number of households being 
targeted in this case is fewer.  
 
Targeting Households with Young Population 
A case can be made to target the poorest households with young population. 
However, as shown from in Table 1, a significant proportion of households have 
children (88 percent). Rolling out such a program to all households with young 
children would require significant resources beyond the resource envelop. We 
therefore only target the poorest households with children in this simulation with 
resources equivalent to 0.5 percent of GDP. To the extent that this program is 
implemented, we find that this would have a large impact on the reduction of 
poverty. Poverty would be reduced by 3 percent over the five year period compared 
to the baseline. The larger impact is partly explained by the larger number of 
































Targeting Labor Constrained 
Lastly we implement a simulation where we target households that are considered to 
be labor constrained. In this case we consider all households who are only 
composed of children of less than 18 years, or only adults above 60 years or with a 
dependency ratio that is more than 3. In this simulation we find that there would be a 
reduction in poverty of 0.5 percent.  
 
Increasing Taxes to Finance Social Transfer Programs 
As noted from the previous sections, its very clear that the way a social cash transfer 
program is financed matters a lot. There are several ways in which the government 
can finance a social cash transfer program. One of them is by raising the direct 
taxes by an equivalent amount and the fiscal deficit remains the same. This tax is 
largely paid by formal sector workers irrespective of whether they are rich or poor. 
Another source of financing is by increasing indirect taxes like VAT. Indirect taxes 
tend to have much wider coverage since they target the consumption side. For the 
case of Uganda, most of the food items are zero rated, and therefore we could 
expect that the poor do not experience much of the burden for this tax. The third 
alternative is by increasing government spending and the corresponding increase in 
the deficit as done in the first three simulations. 
 
This simulation is implemented by using the closure rule where government deficit is 
the same and the tax rates adjust to close the gap as a result of the social cash 
transfer program. Raising taxes to finance social cash transfer programs is actually 
not the best policy option. This is because the tax burden would be born by all 
individuals including those who are targeted by the program. Poverty levels attained 
by all the households targeted would be much less than when the cash transfer is 
financed by higher borrowing.  
 
VII  Conclusion and Policy Implications  
This paper mainly focuses on the various ways through which a social cash transfer 
program can be designed and financed. We look at three different modes of 22 
 
targeting where households are targeted by number of orphans in a household, 
number of young individuals in a household, labor constrained households, and 
households with old individuals of age higher than 60 years. The households are 
categorized into poor and non-poor. We also look at the various ways of financing 
these programs. The first alternative is where we increase the government spending 
to accommodate the social cash transfer program by running a higher fiscal deficit. 
The second alternative is where direct or indirect taxes are increased to cover the 
increased shortfall in the fiscal deficit. 
 
The key finding suggests that increasing government spending to finance social 
cash transfer program could indeed be welfare enhancing for the targeted 
households. Given the small size of the increase in total spending, the 
macroeconomic effects of such programs are considered to be marginal. As noted in 
the results, for programs where the coverage of households is small (like labor 
constrained) the impact on overall poverty is marginal. However, when the program 
is rolled out to a larger program of for example households with youth, this would 
have much larger impact on the reduction of poverty.  
 
 The ideal alternative could be a reallocation of spending and thereby maintaining 
the same level of the deficit. Increasing taxes to finance the social cash transfer 
program is not welfare enhancing. The burden of the taxes and their distortionary 
effects would far outweigh the benefits of the program. 
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Table A1 continued. CGE model sets, parameters, and variables 
Symbol Explanation  Symbol Explanation 
Greek Symbols     
  Efficiency parameter in the 
CES activity function 
t
cr δ   CET function share 
parameter 
  Efficiency parameter in the 
CES value-added function 
 
CES value-added function 
share parameter for factor f 
in activity a 
 




Subsistence consumption of 
marketed commodity c for 
household h 
  Armington function shift 
parameter 
  Yield of output c per unit of 
activity a 
  CET function shift parameter         CES production function 
exponent 
a β  
Capital sectoral mobility 
factor 
  CES value-added function 
exponent 
 
Marginal share of 
consumption spending on 






  CES activity function share 
parameter 
  Armington function exponent 
 
Share parameter for 
domestic commodity 
aggregation function 
  CET function exponent 
q
cr δ   Armington function share 
parameter 
a
fat η   Sector share of new capital 
f υ   Capital depreciation rate     
Exogenous Variables     
  Consumer price index    
Savings rate scaling factor (= 
0 for base) 
 
Change in domestic 
institution tax share  (= 0 for 
base; exogenous variable) 
  Quantity supplied of factor 
   Foreign savings (FCU)   
Direct tax scaling factor (= 0 





Wage distortion factor for 
factor f in activity a 
  Investment adjustment factor     
Endogenous Variables     
a
ft AWF  
Average capital rental rate in 
time period t 
  Government consumption 
demand for commodity 





































DMPS ch QH25 
 
institution savings rates (= 0 
for base; exogenous 
variable) 
commodity c by household h 
 
Producer price index for 
domestically marketed output
 
Quantity of household home 
consumption of commodity c 
from activity a for household 
h 
  Government expenditures    Quantity of aggregate 
intermediate input 
  Consumption spending for 
household 
 
Quantity of commodity c as 
intermediate input to activity 
a 
 
Exchange rate (LCU  per unit 
of FCU) 
  Quantity of investment 
demand for commodity 
  Government savings  cr QM   Quantity of imports of 
commodity c 
  Quantity demanded of factor 
f from activity a    
 
Table A1 continued. CGE model sets, parameters, and variables 
Symbol Explanation  Symbol Explanation 
Endogenous Variables Continued     
 
Marginal propensity to 




Quantity of goods 
supplied to domestic 
market (composite 
supply) 
  Activity price (unit gross 
revenue) 
  
Quantity of commodity 
demanded as trade 
input 
 
Demand price for 
commodity produced 
and sold domestically 
  Quantity of (aggregate) 
value-added 
 
Supply price for 
commodity produced 
and sold domestically 
 
Aggregated quantity of 
domestic output of 
commodity 
cr PE   Export price (domestic 
currency) 
  
Quantity of output of 
commodity c from 
activity a 
  Aggregate intermediate 
input price for activity a 
f RWF   Real average factor 
price 
ft PK  
Unit price of capital in 
time period t     Total nominal 
absorption 
cr PM   Import price (domestic 
currency) 
 
Direct tax rate for 








i MPS c QQ
a PA c QT
c PDD a QVA










institution i’ to i (both in 
the set INSDNG) 
 
Value-added price 
(factor income per unit 
of activity) 
  Average price of factor 
  Aggregate producer 
price for commodity 
  Income of factor f 
 
Producer price of 
commodity c for activity 
a 
  Government revenue 
  Quantity (level) of 
activity 
 







  Income to domestic 
institution i from factor f
cr QE   Quantity of exports 
a
fat K Δ  
Quantity of new capital 
by activity a for time 
period t 
 
c PQ ' ii TRII
a PVA f WF
c PX f YF
ac PXAC YG
a QA i YI
c QD if YIF27 
 
Table A2. CGE model equations 
Production and Price Equations 
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Table A3. CGE model equations (continued) 
cc r c
r
 = QD QE QX +∑   (17)
c c c c cr cr
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Institutional Incomes and Domestic Demand Equations 
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Table A3. CGE Model Equations (continued) 
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System Constraints and Macroeconomic Closures 
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